docs: bring RUNBOOK and ARCHITECTURE up to date

The runner moved to node0 and the drift check reads release secrets via the
Kubernetes API in-cluster; the docs still described node2 and `helm list`.

- RUNBOOK: the durable image-cache fix is now the node0 hostPath store, not a
  node2 pin; /data is NFS RWX, so the Multi-Attach wait is gone. Cross-references
  entries 9 and 10.
- ARCHITECTURE: the reconciler's edge to the cluster is "list releases", not
  "helm list" (helm is the out-of-cluster fallback).
- ARCHITECTURE: the state diagram and its prose described fail() moving every
  dead-lettered instance to `failed`. Corrected to the per-kind behaviour — only
  provision fails the instance; deprovision stays `deleting` for retry, upgrade
  and verify stay `ready` — matching the fix in tasks.py.

ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ flowchart LR
     WORKER -->|"claim<br/>SKIP LOCKED"| PG
     WORKER -->|"helm upgrade --install"| K8S
     RECON -->|"drift, leases,<br/>TTL, versions"| PG
-    RECON -->|"helm list"| K8S
+    RECON -->|"list releases"| K8S
 
     classDef truth fill:#2d4a22,stroke:#5a8f3d,color:#fff
     classDef derived fill:#4a3222,stroke:#8f6a3d,color:#fff
@@ -191,12 +191,12 @@ stateDiagram-v2
     ready --> deleting: DELETE, or TTL expired
     deleting --> deleted: helm uninstall succeeded
 
-    requested --> failed: attempts exhausted
+    requested --> failed: provision attempts exhausted
-    provisioning --> failed: attempts exhausted
+    provisioning --> failed: provision attempts exhausted
     ready --> failed: drift — the release vanished
     failed --> provisioning: retry
     failed --> deleting: give up, tear it down
-    deleting --> failed: attempts exhausted
+    deleting --> deleting: deprovision retried, never failed
 
     deleted --> [*]: terminal
 ```
@@ -205,19 +205,31 @@ stateDiagram-v2
 chain of `if`s. `deleted` maps to an **empty frozenset** rather than being absent, so
 "terminal" is stated rather than implied by a missing key.
 
-**The state machine is enforced in SQL too.** `TaskRepo.fail` writes `instances.state`
+**Dead-lettering the task does not fail the instance, except for provision.** When a task
-directly, so it derives its guard from the same `LEGAL` table:
+exhausts its retries `TaskRepo.fail` marks the *task* `failed` for every kind. It moves the
+*instance* to `failed` only for `provision`, because that is the only kind where a dead
+letter means the instance is broken. For the others the instance is still healthy and
+something else owns its recovery:
+
+| kind | instance state on dead-letter | why |
+|------|-------------------------------|-----|
+| provision | `failed` | it never came up; a human re-provisions |
+| deprovision | stays `deleting` | so `due_for_deprovision` re-enqueues it; `failed` would strand it and leak the release |
+| upgrade | stays `ready` | `helm --atomic` rolled back; it still serves the old version |
+| verify | stays `ready` | `handle_verify` already halted the rollout |
+
+The provision write is still guarded by the state machine, derived from the same `LEGAL`
+table rather than restated:
 
 ```python
 _CAN_FAIL = tuple(s.value for s, allowed in LEGAL.items() if InstanceState.FAILED in allowed)
 ...
-UPDATE instances SET state='failed' WHERE id=%s AND state = ANY(%s)
+if kind == 'provision':
+    UPDATE instances SET state='failed' WHERE id=%s AND state = ANY(%s)
 ```
 
-Without that, a deprovision exhausting its retries against an already-`deleted` instance
+The `SvcforgeTaskDeadLettered` alert fires for every kind, so leaving the instance alone
-would resurrect it into `failed` — a transition `transition()` explicitly forbids,
+loses no operator visibility.
-performed by raw SQL that never asked it. A state machine only one layer respects is
-decoration.
 
 ---
 
@@ -278,7 +290,7 @@ One replica. Four checks. Every 60 seconds.
 
 ```mermaid
 flowchart LR
-    TICK(("tick<br/>every 60s")) --> D["<b>drift</b><br/>helm list vs DB"]
+    TICK(("tick<br/>every 60s")) --> D["<b>drift</b><br/>live releases vs DB"]
     TICK --> L["<b>lease expiry</b><br/>running + locked_at old"]
     TICK --> T["<b>TTL</b><br/>ready + expires_at passed"]
     TICK --> V["<b>version drift</b><br/>chart_version ≠ catalog"]

RUNBOOK.md

@@ -118,11 +118,13 @@ kubectl -n gitea exec gitea-actions-runner-0 -c dind -- docker pull \
   ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04@sha256:c710431fbad9eb3bcb102d04e5ff74fbd0ce6e383f78afebfb3770a1a817fdf9
 ```
 
-The durable fix is to stop the runner restarting. Its `/data` PVC is ReadWriteOnce, so
+The durable fix is a persistent image store, which the runner now has: `/var/lib/docker`
-every reschedule hits `Multi-Attach error` and the pod sits in Init until Longhorn detaches
+is a hostPath on node0 (see `oci-k8s/.../addons/tasks/main.yml`), so the act image survives
-from the old node. It is pinned to node2 in `oci-k8s/.../addons/tasks/main.yml` for exactly
+a restart and is not re-pulled. The runner is pinned to **node0**, not node2 — node2 is a
-that reason. A dedicated PVC for the image cache would survive restarts outright, but on
+single-core control-plane node whose pod network was measured 21x slower under its own
-this cluster that volume faulted and blocked the runner, so it is deliberately not used.
+load, which starved every clone and pull. Its `/data` PVC is NFS ReadWriteMany, so a
+reschedule attaches immediately with no `Multi-Attach` wait. Entries 9 and 10 cover the
+caches and the node move in full.
 
 ### 6. Stopping a run, and reading a restarted runner correctly