review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files.
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@@ -148,15 +148,29 @@ prometheusRule:
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annotations:
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summary: svcforge p95 provision time is over 5 minutes
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runbook_url: https://gitea.oci-oci.duckdns.org/gitea_admin/svcforge/src/branch/master/RUNBOOK.md#provision-failing
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- alert: SvcforgeTaskFailed
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expr: sum(svcforge_tasks_failed_total) > 0
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# `increase(...[15m])`, not the raw counter. `sum(counter) > 0` on a monotonic counter
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# latches: one dead-lettered task at any point keeps this firing until the pod restarts,
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# and a restart silently clears it — so it can never distinguish "failing now" from
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# "failed last Tuesday". The dead-letter counter is also the right one: the attempts
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# counter increments on ordinary transient retries that later succeed.
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- alert: SvcforgeTaskDeadLettered
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expr: sum(increase(svcforge_tasks_dead_lettered_total[15m])) > 0
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for: 5m
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labels:
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severity: warning
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annotations:
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summary: a svcforge task exhausted its retries
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runbook_url: https://gitea.oci-oci.duckdns.org/gitea_admin/svcforge/src/branch/master/RUNBOOK.md#provision-failing
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# Scoped to the reconciler job, and aggregated with max().
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#
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# RECONCILER_LAST_TICK is a module-level Gauge in obs.py, so EVERY service that imports
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# svcforge_core.obs registers and exports it — api and worker included, permanently at
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# 0. Unscoped, `time() - 0` is ~1.7e9, so this critical alert fires from the moment the
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# chart is installed, from pods that have no reconciler in them. Scope by job, then
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# max() so a rolling restart of the single reconciler does not flap it.
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- alert: SvcforgeReconcilerStale
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expr: time() - svcforge_reconciler_last_tick_timestamp_seconds > 300
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expr: time() - max(svcforge_reconciler_last_tick_timestamp_seconds{job=~".*reconciler.*"}) > 300
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for: 5m
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labels:
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severity: critical
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annotations:
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