review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ RUN --mount=type=cache,target=/root/.cache/uv \
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COPY libs/ libs/
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COPY services/api/ services/api/
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COPY catalog.yaml ./
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# The migrate Job runs from THIS image (migrate-job.yaml pins the api digest), so the SQL
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# has to be in it. svcforge_core.migrate's fallback resolves MIGRATIONS_DIR relative to
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# its own __file__, which lands under site-packages here — a directory that does not and
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# should not contain SQL — so main() returned 1 and the pre-install/pre-upgrade hook
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# failed every sync. SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR below points it at this copy instead.
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COPY migrations/ migrations/
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# --no-editable is what turns svcforge-core into a real wheel in site-packages.
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# pyproject.toml declares it `editable = true` for local dev; an editable install in an
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# image points at /app/libs, which is a source tree that need not survive the final stage.
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@@ -50,6 +56,7 @@ WORKDIR /app
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COPY --from=builder --chown=10001:10001 /app /app
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ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH" \
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PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
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PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
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PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
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SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR=/app/migrations
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USER 10001
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ENTRYPOINT ["python", "-m", "services.api"]
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+28
-5
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
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from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer
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from jwt import PyJWKClient
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from svcforge_core.adapters.redis import RateLimiterProto
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from svcforge_core.domain.models import CatalogEntry
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from svcforge_core.repo.db import DictPool
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from svcforge_core.repo.instances import InstanceRepo
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@@ -146,13 +147,35 @@ async def _signing_key(client: PyJWKClient, token: str) -> jwt.PyJWK:
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return await asyncio.to_thread(client.get_signing_key_from_jwt, token)
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async def rate_limit(team: Annotated[str, Depends(get_current_team)]) -> None:
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"""Per-team rate limiting. Seam only — Module 10 fills this in (Redis, Lua, token bucket).
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def get_rate_limiter(request: Request) -> RateLimiterProto | None:
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"""The limiter lifespan built, or None when no Redis is configured."""
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limiter: RateLimiterProto | None = getattr(request.app.state, "rate_limiter", None)
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return limiter
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It exists now, wired into the routes, so that turning it on is an edit to one function
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body rather than a change to every handler signature.
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async def rate_limit(
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request: Request,
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team: Annotated[str, Depends(get_current_team)],
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) -> None:
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"""Per-team rate limiting. One Redis command per check, and it fails OPEN.
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Failing open is the entire policy. Redis holds derived state; losing it must degrade
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the platform, never stop it. A limiter that fails closed converts a cache outage into
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a total outage, which is a strictly worse incident than the burst it was protecting
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against — so `RateLimiter.check` swallows its own errors and returns `allowed=True`.
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The 429 below therefore only ever comes from a real, counted overage.
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"""
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return None
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limiter = get_rate_limiter(request)
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if limiter is None:
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return
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result = await limiter.check(team)
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if not result.allowed:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
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detail={"code": "rate_limited", "message": "too many requests"},
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headers={"Retry-After": str(result.retry_after_s)},
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)
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async def idempotency_key(request: Request) -> str | None:
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+31
-6
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ environment at import time — before any fixture can say otherwise.
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import logging
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from collections.abc import AsyncIterator
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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@@ -18,11 +17,13 @@ from jwt import PyJWKClient
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from services.api.models import ErrorBody
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from services.api.routes import health, instances
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from svcforge_core import obs
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from svcforge_core.adapters.redis import RateLimiter, make_redis
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from svcforge_core.domain.catalog import load_catalog
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from svcforge_core.repo.db import make_pool
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from svcforge_core.settings import Settings, load_settings
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log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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log = obs.get_logger("svcforge.api")
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@asynccontextmanager
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@@ -42,6 +43,16 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncIterator[None]:
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app.state.catalog = load_catalog(settings.catalog_path)
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# Redis is optional by construction. `make_redis` returns None when no DSN is set, and
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# every consumer treats None as "skip" — so a deployment without Redis loses rate
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# limiting and keeps everything else. Built here rather than per request because a
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# connection pool per request is a connection pool per request.
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redis = make_redis(settings)
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app.state.redis = redis
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app.state.rate_limiter = (
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RateLimiter(redis, limit=settings.rate_limit_per_minute, window_s=60) if redis is not None else None
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)
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pool = make_pool(str(settings.pg_dsn), settings.pool_min_size, settings.pool_max_size)
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# wait=True fails NOW, loudly, if the DSN is wrong — instead of at the first request,
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# as a PoolTimeout, in front of a user.
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@@ -68,6 +79,8 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI) -> AsyncIterator[None]:
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yield
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finally:
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await pool.close()
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if redis is not None:
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await redis.aclose()
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async def _http_exception_handler(request: Request, exc: Exception) -> JSONResponse:
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@@ -93,6 +106,18 @@ def create_app(settings: Settings | None = None) -> FastAPI:
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"""App factory: lifespan, routers, exception handler, /metrics."""
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settings = settings or load_settings()
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# FIRST, before any router is built and before any logger is bound. Without this the
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# API is the one service of three that never configures structlog: its lines go out
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# through logging.lastResort as bare text on stderr with no service, no trace_id and
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# no JSON envelope — a parse failure in the collector, and unattributable in Loki.
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# `settings.log_json` was silently inert here for the same reason.
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obs.setup("svcforge-api", settings)
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# Refuse the dev escape hatches when SVCFORGE_ENVIRONMENT says this is not a laptop.
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# Called unconditionally and early: a check that only runs from a branch someone
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# remembered to write is a check that does not run.
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settings.check_production()
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app = FastAPI(
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title="svcforge",
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version="0.1.0",
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@@ -115,7 +140,7 @@ def app() -> FastAPI:
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return create_app()
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if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
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import uvicorn
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uvicorn.run("services.api.main:app", factory=True, host="0.0.0.0", port=8000) # noqa: S104
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# There is deliberately no `if __name__ == "__main__"` here. `services/api/__main__.py` is
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# the single entrypoint, and the image's ENTRYPOINT uses it. A second one in this module
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# drifted from it — different log_level, different access_log — so `python -m services.api`
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# and `python services/api/main.py` started the same app two different ways.
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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"""Liveness, readiness, metrics.
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The distinction between the first two is not pedantry, it is the difference between a
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30-second blip and a fleet-wide outage:
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The distinction between the first two is the difference between a 30-second blip and a
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fleet-wide outage:
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* `/healthz` (liveness) answers "is this process wedged?" A failure here gets the
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container KILLED. It must therefore touch NOTHING external. Wire it to the DB and a
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