review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS
- lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose
  lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or
  requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on
  (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests.
- worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception
  escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a
  DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod.
- claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and
  report 'queue empty'. LEFT join.
- InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted.
- handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a
  dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later.
- handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt.

DEPLOY-BREAKING
- the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and
  migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for
  an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR.
- ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped.
- SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is
  module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job.
- SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m].
- the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder.
- worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout.

DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
- adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and
  the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision.
- adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired
  into the API, failing open.
- Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and
  called from every entrypoint.

OBSERVABILITY
- the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json
  silently inert.
- LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge.
- bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task.
- split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered.

SECURITY
- trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl
  1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3,
  which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster.

TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL
- the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker.
- the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the
  chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side.
- fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files.

DOCS
- ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD
  guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server).
- AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md.
- prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files.
This commit is contained in:
Nguyen Minh Phuc
2026-07-18 12:13:49 +00:00
parent 77d560ddae
commit c76154aeaa
45 changed files with 1520 additions and 216 deletions
+15 -2
View File
@@ -41,8 +41,21 @@ RUN useradd -u 10001 -m -s /usr/sbin/nologin svcforge
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=builder --chown=10001:10001 /app /app
COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.16.2@sha256:a19a2968fd672336d39771f6c899781424d725229148656dbc2a1e305003cdec /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
COPY --from=bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2@sha256:0eab9ec8f5e0f75271277467ebb7513b36dea0122bc68615d18c47fece4fd82c /opt/bitnami/kubectl/bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
# helm 3.21.3, not 3.16.2. 3.16.2 was built with Go 1.22.9 and carries CRITICAL
# CVE-2025-68121 (crypto/tls) and CVE-2026-33186 (grpc), plus HIGH CVE-2026-35469
# (spdystream, fixed in 0.5.1) — trivy fails the build on them and is right to.
# Deliberately 3.x: helm 4 is a breaking change and is not a CVE fix.
COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.21.3@sha256:35da09ba0716fc7c3cd63b6b31ee380a9c7662e95f29ab0e4ae962420afd315b /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
# kubectl 1.35.3 from the OFFICIAL registry.k8s.io image, replacing
# bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2. Two reasons, either sufficient:
# - CVEs: the bitnami image is Go 1.22.9 and ships containerd < 1.7.29 (HIGH
# CVE-2024-25621) along with the same crypto/tls and grpc CRITICALs as helm above.
# - Skew: the target cluster runs v1.35.3. 1.31.2 is four minors behind, well outside
# kubectl's supported +/-1 window, so it was unsupported against this cluster.
# bitnamilegacy publishes no 1.35 tag. registry.k8s.io/kubectl is the upstream-maintained
# image, is a manifest list with linux/arm64 (this cluster is Ampere), and puts the binary
# at /bin/kubectl rather than bitnami's /opt/bitnami path.
COPY --from=registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.35.3@sha256:8dad99b604a2c0bafe17f53cadf78482d6f667a6da687f385508f5f4e4696d37 /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH" \
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
+19
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ run in milliseconds against a FakeProvisioner instead of needing a cluster.
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Protocol
from svcforge_core.adapters.clock import Clock
from svcforge_core.adapters.helm import Provisioner
@@ -19,6 +20,20 @@ from svcforge_core.repo.tasks import TaskRepo
from svcforge_core.settings import Settings
class NamespaceEnsurer(Protocol):
"""The one thing the worker needs from kubectl.
Narrower than `KubectlClient` on purpose: the handler creates namespaces and does
nothing else with the cluster, so that is the whole interface. Satisfied by
`KubectlClient` in production and by a fake in tests, which is what keeps the worker
suite running in milliseconds with no cluster.
"""
async def ensure_namespace(self, ns: str, labels: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
"""Create the namespace if absent. Idempotent — safe on every retry."""
...
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class WorkerDeps:
"""Everything a handler is allowed to touch."""
@@ -27,6 +42,10 @@ class WorkerDeps:
instances: InstanceRepo
tasks: TaskRepo
provisioner: Provisioner
# Creates the tenant namespace before helm is pointed at it. `helm --namespace X`
# does NOT create X, so without this the very first provision for a new team fails
# with "namespace not found" — the one path that is guaranteed untested by a fake.
namespaces: NamespaceEnsurer
notifier: Notifier
clock: Clock
catalog: dict[str, CatalogEntry]
+34 -8
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Every handler here obeys one rule: running it twice must equal running it once.
That is not a nicety. A worker can be SIGKILLed after helm has installed the release but
A worker can be SIGKILLed after helm has installed the release but
before the DB row says so; the lease expires; another worker claims the same task and runs
this function again. If the handler is not idempotent, the tenant gets two Elasticsearches
and you get a bill. Idempotency is what makes the crash safe, and it is bought in two
@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@ async def handle_provision(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
# below is idempotent either way, so this is bookkeeping, not a lock.
await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.REQUESTED, InstanceState.PROVISIONING)
# `helm --namespace X` does not create X. Every tenant's first provision lands in a
# namespace that does not exist yet, so this has to happen before helm runs or the
# install fails with "namespaces not found". Idempotent (kubectl apply of a Namespace
# manifest), so it costs one no-op API call on every subsequent provision.
await deps.namespaces.ensure_namespace(
inst.namespace,
labels={"svcforge.io/team": inst.team},
)
await deps.provisioner.install(
release=inst.release_name,
ns=inst.namespace,
@@ -92,7 +101,15 @@ async def handle_deprovision(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
# `helm uninstall` of an already-gone release is not an error to us: the adapter
# swallows not-found, because the desired state — no release — is already true.
await deps.provisioner.uninstall(release=inst.release_name, ns=inst.namespace)
await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.DELETING, InstanceState.DELETED)
# Raise rather than ignore the CAS result. Swallowing it means: the release is gone,
# the row keeps `state=ready` and its now-dangling endpoint, the task is marked done,
# and 60 seconds later the reconciler's drift check re-provisions the thing the tenant
# asked to delete. Failing loudly turns a silent ping-pong into one visible error.
if not await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.DELETING, InstanceState.DELETED):
raise HandlerError(
f"instance {inst.id} was {inst.state.value}, expected {InstanceState.DELETING.value}"
)
async def handle_upgrade(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
@@ -138,18 +155,27 @@ async def handle_verify(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
if inst.release_name in releases:
return
# `returning` + a `where` on the update half tells us whether THIS call was the one
# that halted the rollout. The halt itself is idempotent; the page is not. Without the
# distinction, a verify that fails its full retry budget sends five identical
# notifications for one incident, spread across the backoff curve.
async with deps.pool.connection() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
await cur.execute(
"""insert into catalog_versions (service_type, rollout_state)
values (%s, 'halted')
on conflict (service_type) do update set rollout_state = 'halted'""",
on conflict (service_type) do update set rollout_state = 'halted'
where catalog_versions.rollout_state <> 'halted'
returning service_type""",
(inst.service_type,),
)
await deps.notifier.send(
"rollout.halted",
f"rollout halted for {inst.service_type}: {inst.release_name} failed verify",
{"instance_id": str(inst.id), "team": inst.team, "service_type": inst.service_type},
)
newly_halted = await cur.fetchone() is not None
if newly_halted:
await deps.notifier.send(
"rollout.halted",
f"rollout halted for {inst.service_type}: {inst.release_name} failed verify",
{"instance_id": str(inst.id), "team": inst.team, "service_type": inst.service_type},
)
raise HandlerError(f"verify failed for {inst.release_name}; rollout halted")
+48 -7
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import asyncio
import contextlib
import signal
import time
from collections.abc import Awaitable
from opentelemetry import trace
@@ -21,9 +22,10 @@ from services.worker.handlers import HANDLERS
from svcforge_core import obs
from svcforge_core.adapters.clock import SystemClock
from svcforge_core.adapters.helm import HelmProvisioner
from svcforge_core.adapters.k8s import KubectlClient
from svcforge_core.adapters.notify import LogNotifier
from svcforge_core.domain.catalog import load_catalog
from svcforge_core.domain.models import Task
from svcforge_core.domain.models import Task, TaskKind
from svcforge_core.repo.db import make_pool
from svcforge_core.repo.instances import InstanceRepo
from svcforge_core.repo.tasks import TaskRepo
@@ -42,8 +44,28 @@ async def _sleep_or_stop(stop: asyncio.Event, seconds: float) -> None:
await asyncio.wait_for(stop.wait(), timeout=seconds)
async def _report(coro: Awaitable[bool], task_id: int, what: str) -> None:
"""Run a terminal report, and never let its failure escape.
Reporting is the one thing that must not kill the worker. `_run_one` runs inside a
TaskGroup, and a TaskGroup cancels every sibling the moment one child raises — so a
DB blip during `tasks.fail()` would abort every other in-flight provision on this pod,
not just this one. The task itself is safe either way: it stays `running` and the
reconciler's lease sweep returns it to the queue. Losing the report costs one lease
interval; losing the siblings costs their work.
"""
try:
if not await coro:
# The lease was stolen while we were working: another worker owns this task
# now and is mid-run. Reporting is theirs to do, not ours.
log.warning("lease lost before report; another worker owns this task", task_id=task_id)
except Exception:
log.exception("could not report task %s (%s); lease will expire", task_id, what)
async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None:
"""Run one task to a terminal report. Never lets an exception escape the TaskGroup."""
worker_id = deps.settings.worker_id
try:
# Every log line from here carries instance_id/task_id/team. Bound once, at claim,
# rather than passed down: the alternative is threading three arguments through
@@ -55,7 +77,11 @@ async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None
handler = HANDLERS.get(task.kind)
if handler is None:
await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, f"no handler for {task.kind}", max_attempts=1)
await _report(
deps.tasks.fail(task.id, f"no handler for {task.kind}", worker_id, max_attempts=1),
task.id,
"no-handler",
)
return
# Re-parent to the span that enqueued this task. Without the stored traceparent
@@ -77,17 +103,30 @@ async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None
# CancelledError inherits from BaseException, so `except Exception` below
# would never see it. Catch it only to release the claim, then ALWAYS
# re-raise: swallowing it breaks cancellation for everyone above us.
await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, "cancelled", max_attempts=deps.settings.max_attempts)
await _report(
deps.tasks.fail(task.id, "cancelled", worker_id, deps.settings.max_attempts),
task.id,
"cancelled",
)
raise
except Exception as exc:
log.exception("task failed", kind=task.kind.value, error=str(exc))
span.record_exception(exc)
span.set_status(trace.Status(trace.StatusCode.ERROR, str(exc)))
obs.TASKS_FAILED.labels(kind=task.kind.value).inc()
await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, str(exc), max_attempts=deps.settings.max_attempts)
obs.TASK_ATTEMPTS_FAILED.labels(kind=task.kind.value).inc()
await _report(
deps.tasks.fail(task.id, str(exc), worker_id, deps.settings.max_attempts),
task.id,
"fail",
)
else:
obs.PROVISION_TIME.observe(time.monotonic() - started)
await deps.tasks.complete(task.id)
# Only provisions go in the provision histogram. The buckets run 10s..1800s
# because they were sized for helm installs; a sub-second `verify` dropped
# into the same series drags the p95 down and quietly stops
# SvcforgeProvisionSlow from ever firing.
if task.kind is TaskKind.PROVISION:
obs.PROVISION_TIME.observe(time.monotonic() - started)
await _report(deps.tasks.complete(task.id, worker_id), task.id, "complete")
finally:
sem.release()
@@ -135,6 +174,7 @@ async def _amain() -> None:
# the SvcforgeTaskFailed / SvcforgeProvisionSlow alerts query do not exist until the
# registry is up.
obs.setup("svcforge-worker", settings)
settings.check_production()
obs.start_metrics_server(settings.metrics_port)
pool = make_pool(settings.pg_dsn.unicode_string(), settings.pool_min_size, settings.pool_max_size)
@@ -145,6 +185,7 @@ async def _amain() -> None:
instances=InstanceRepo(pool),
tasks=TaskRepo(pool),
provisioner=HelmProvisioner(helm_bin=settings.helm_bin, timeout_s=int(settings.helm_timeout_s)),
namespaces=KubectlClient(kubectl_bin=settings.kubectl_bin),
notifier=LogNotifier(),
clock=SystemClock(),
catalog=load_catalog(settings.catalog_path),