review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -41,8 +41,21 @@ RUN useradd -u 10001 -m -s /usr/sbin/nologin svcforge
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WORKDIR /app
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COPY --from=builder --chown=10001:10001 /app /app
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COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.16.2@sha256:a19a2968fd672336d39771f6c899781424d725229148656dbc2a1e305003cdec /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
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COPY --from=bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2@sha256:0eab9ec8f5e0f75271277467ebb7513b36dea0122bc68615d18c47fece4fd82c /opt/bitnami/kubectl/bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
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# helm 3.21.3, not 3.16.2. 3.16.2 was built with Go 1.22.9 and carries CRITICAL
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# CVE-2025-68121 (crypto/tls) and CVE-2026-33186 (grpc), plus HIGH CVE-2026-35469
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# (spdystream, fixed in 0.5.1) — trivy fails the build on them and is right to.
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# Deliberately 3.x: helm 4 is a breaking change and is not a CVE fix.
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COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.21.3@sha256:35da09ba0716fc7c3cd63b6b31ee380a9c7662e95f29ab0e4ae962420afd315b /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
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# kubectl 1.35.3 from the OFFICIAL registry.k8s.io image, replacing
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# bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2. Two reasons, either sufficient:
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# - CVEs: the bitnami image is Go 1.22.9 and ships containerd < 1.7.29 (HIGH
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# CVE-2024-25621) along with the same crypto/tls and grpc CRITICALs as helm above.
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# - Skew: the target cluster runs v1.35.3. 1.31.2 is four minors behind, well outside
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# kubectl's supported +/-1 window, so it was unsupported against this cluster.
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# bitnamilegacy publishes no 1.35 tag. registry.k8s.io/kubectl is the upstream-maintained
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# image, is a manifest list with linux/arm64 (this cluster is Ampere), and puts the binary
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# at /bin/kubectl rather than bitnami's /opt/bitnami path.
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COPY --from=registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.35.3@sha256:8dad99b604a2c0bafe17f53cadf78482d6f667a6da687f385508f5f4e4696d37 /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
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ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH" \
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PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ run in milliseconds against a FakeProvisioner instead of needing a cluster.
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Protocol
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from svcforge_core.adapters.clock import Clock
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from svcforge_core.adapters.helm import Provisioner
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@@ -19,6 +20,20 @@ from svcforge_core.repo.tasks import TaskRepo
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from svcforge_core.settings import Settings
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class NamespaceEnsurer(Protocol):
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"""The one thing the worker needs from kubectl.
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Narrower than `KubectlClient` on purpose: the handler creates namespaces and does
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nothing else with the cluster, so that is the whole interface. Satisfied by
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`KubectlClient` in production and by a fake in tests, which is what keeps the worker
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suite running in milliseconds with no cluster.
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"""
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async def ensure_namespace(self, ns: str, labels: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> None:
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"""Create the namespace if absent. Idempotent — safe on every retry."""
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...
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class WorkerDeps:
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"""Everything a handler is allowed to touch."""
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@@ -27,6 +42,10 @@ class WorkerDeps:
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instances: InstanceRepo
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tasks: TaskRepo
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provisioner: Provisioner
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# Creates the tenant namespace before helm is pointed at it. `helm --namespace X`
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# does NOT create X, so without this the very first provision for a new team fails
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# with "namespace not found" — the one path that is guaranteed untested by a fake.
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namespaces: NamespaceEnsurer
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notifier: Notifier
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clock: Clock
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catalog: dict[str, CatalogEntry]
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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Every handler here obeys one rule: running it twice must equal running it once.
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That is not a nicety. A worker can be SIGKILLed after helm has installed the release but
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A worker can be SIGKILLed after helm has installed the release but
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before the DB row says so; the lease expires; another worker claims the same task and runs
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this function again. If the handler is not idempotent, the tenant gets two Elasticsearches
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and you get a bill. Idempotency is what makes the crash safe, and it is bought in two
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@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@ async def handle_provision(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
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# below is idempotent either way, so this is bookkeeping, not a lock.
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await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.REQUESTED, InstanceState.PROVISIONING)
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# `helm --namespace X` does not create X. Every tenant's first provision lands in a
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# namespace that does not exist yet, so this has to happen before helm runs or the
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# install fails with "namespaces not found". Idempotent (kubectl apply of a Namespace
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# manifest), so it costs one no-op API call on every subsequent provision.
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await deps.namespaces.ensure_namespace(
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inst.namespace,
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labels={"svcforge.io/team": inst.team},
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)
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await deps.provisioner.install(
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release=inst.release_name,
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ns=inst.namespace,
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@@ -92,7 +101,15 @@ async def handle_deprovision(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
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# `helm uninstall` of an already-gone release is not an error to us: the adapter
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# swallows not-found, because the desired state — no release — is already true.
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await deps.provisioner.uninstall(release=inst.release_name, ns=inst.namespace)
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await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.DELETING, InstanceState.DELETED)
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# Raise rather than ignore the CAS result. Swallowing it means: the release is gone,
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# the row keeps `state=ready` and its now-dangling endpoint, the task is marked done,
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# and 60 seconds later the reconciler's drift check re-provisions the thing the tenant
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# asked to delete. Failing loudly turns a silent ping-pong into one visible error.
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if not await deps.instances.update_state(inst.id, InstanceState.DELETING, InstanceState.DELETED):
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raise HandlerError(
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f"instance {inst.id} was {inst.state.value}, expected {InstanceState.DELETING.value}"
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)
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async def handle_upgrade(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
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@@ -138,18 +155,27 @@ async def handle_verify(task: Task, deps: WorkerDeps) -> None:
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if inst.release_name in releases:
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return
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# `returning` + a `where` on the update half tells us whether THIS call was the one
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# that halted the rollout. The halt itself is idempotent; the page is not. Without the
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# distinction, a verify that fails its full retry budget sends five identical
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# notifications for one incident, spread across the backoff curve.
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async with deps.pool.connection() as conn, conn.cursor() as cur:
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await cur.execute(
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"""insert into catalog_versions (service_type, rollout_state)
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values (%s, 'halted')
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on conflict (service_type) do update set rollout_state = 'halted'""",
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on conflict (service_type) do update set rollout_state = 'halted'
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where catalog_versions.rollout_state <> 'halted'
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returning service_type""",
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(inst.service_type,),
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)
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await deps.notifier.send(
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"rollout.halted",
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f"rollout halted for {inst.service_type}: {inst.release_name} failed verify",
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{"instance_id": str(inst.id), "team": inst.team, "service_type": inst.service_type},
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)
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newly_halted = await cur.fetchone() is not None
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if newly_halted:
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await deps.notifier.send(
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"rollout.halted",
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f"rollout halted for {inst.service_type}: {inst.release_name} failed verify",
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{"instance_id": str(inst.id), "team": inst.team, "service_type": inst.service_type},
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)
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raise HandlerError(f"verify failed for {inst.release_name}; rollout halted")
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+48
-7
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import asyncio
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import contextlib
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import signal
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import time
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from collections.abc import Awaitable
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from opentelemetry import trace
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@@ -21,9 +22,10 @@ from services.worker.handlers import HANDLERS
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from svcforge_core import obs
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from svcforge_core.adapters.clock import SystemClock
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from svcforge_core.adapters.helm import HelmProvisioner
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from svcforge_core.adapters.k8s import KubectlClient
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from svcforge_core.adapters.notify import LogNotifier
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from svcforge_core.domain.catalog import load_catalog
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from svcforge_core.domain.models import Task
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from svcforge_core.domain.models import Task, TaskKind
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from svcforge_core.repo.db import make_pool
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from svcforge_core.repo.instances import InstanceRepo
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from svcforge_core.repo.tasks import TaskRepo
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@@ -42,8 +44,28 @@ async def _sleep_or_stop(stop: asyncio.Event, seconds: float) -> None:
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await asyncio.wait_for(stop.wait(), timeout=seconds)
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async def _report(coro: Awaitable[bool], task_id: int, what: str) -> None:
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"""Run a terminal report, and never let its failure escape.
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Reporting is the one thing that must not kill the worker. `_run_one` runs inside a
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TaskGroup, and a TaskGroup cancels every sibling the moment one child raises — so a
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DB blip during `tasks.fail()` would abort every other in-flight provision on this pod,
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not just this one. The task itself is safe either way: it stays `running` and the
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reconciler's lease sweep returns it to the queue. Losing the report costs one lease
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interval; losing the siblings costs their work.
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"""
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try:
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if not await coro:
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# The lease was stolen while we were working: another worker owns this task
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# now and is mid-run. Reporting is theirs to do, not ours.
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log.warning("lease lost before report; another worker owns this task", task_id=task_id)
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except Exception:
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log.exception("could not report task %s (%s); lease will expire", task_id, what)
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async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None:
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"""Run one task to a terminal report. Never lets an exception escape the TaskGroup."""
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worker_id = deps.settings.worker_id
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try:
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# Every log line from here carries instance_id/task_id/team. Bound once, at claim,
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# rather than passed down: the alternative is threading three arguments through
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@@ -55,7 +77,11 @@ async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None
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handler = HANDLERS.get(task.kind)
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if handler is None:
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await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, f"no handler for {task.kind}", max_attempts=1)
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await _report(
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deps.tasks.fail(task.id, f"no handler for {task.kind}", worker_id, max_attempts=1),
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task.id,
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"no-handler",
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)
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return
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# Re-parent to the span that enqueued this task. Without the stored traceparent
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@@ -77,17 +103,30 @@ async def _run_one(deps: WorkerDeps, task: Task, sem: asyncio.Semaphore) -> None
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# CancelledError inherits from BaseException, so `except Exception` below
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# would never see it. Catch it only to release the claim, then ALWAYS
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# re-raise: swallowing it breaks cancellation for everyone above us.
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await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, "cancelled", max_attempts=deps.settings.max_attempts)
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await _report(
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deps.tasks.fail(task.id, "cancelled", worker_id, deps.settings.max_attempts),
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task.id,
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"cancelled",
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)
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raise
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except Exception as exc:
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log.exception("task failed", kind=task.kind.value, error=str(exc))
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span.record_exception(exc)
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span.set_status(trace.Status(trace.StatusCode.ERROR, str(exc)))
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obs.TASKS_FAILED.labels(kind=task.kind.value).inc()
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await deps.tasks.fail(task.id, str(exc), max_attempts=deps.settings.max_attempts)
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obs.TASK_ATTEMPTS_FAILED.labels(kind=task.kind.value).inc()
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await _report(
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deps.tasks.fail(task.id, str(exc), worker_id, deps.settings.max_attempts),
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task.id,
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"fail",
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)
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else:
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obs.PROVISION_TIME.observe(time.monotonic() - started)
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await deps.tasks.complete(task.id)
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# Only provisions go in the provision histogram. The buckets run 10s..1800s
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# because they were sized for helm installs; a sub-second `verify` dropped
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# into the same series drags the p95 down and quietly stops
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# SvcforgeProvisionSlow from ever firing.
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if task.kind is TaskKind.PROVISION:
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obs.PROVISION_TIME.observe(time.monotonic() - started)
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await _report(deps.tasks.complete(task.id, worker_id), task.id, "complete")
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finally:
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sem.release()
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@@ -135,6 +174,7 @@ async def _amain() -> None:
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# the SvcforgeTaskFailed / SvcforgeProvisionSlow alerts query do not exist until the
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# registry is up.
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obs.setup("svcforge-worker", settings)
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settings.check_production()
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obs.start_metrics_server(settings.metrics_port)
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pool = make_pool(settings.pg_dsn.unicode_string(), settings.pool_min_size, settings.pool_max_size)
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@@ -145,6 +185,7 @@ async def _amain() -> None:
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instances=InstanceRepo(pool),
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tasks=TaskRepo(pool),
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provisioner=HelmProvisioner(helm_bin=settings.helm_bin, timeout_s=int(settings.helm_timeout_s)),
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namespaces=KubectlClient(kubectl_bin=settings.kubectl_bin),
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notifier=LogNotifier(),
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clock=SystemClock(),
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catalog=load_catalog(settings.catalog_path),
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