review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files.
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@@ -41,8 +41,21 @@ RUN useradd -u 10001 -m -s /usr/sbin/nologin svcforge
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WORKDIR /app
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COPY --from=builder --chown=10001:10001 /app /app
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COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.16.2@sha256:a19a2968fd672336d39771f6c899781424d725229148656dbc2a1e305003cdec /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
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COPY --from=bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2@sha256:0eab9ec8f5e0f75271277467ebb7513b36dea0122bc68615d18c47fece4fd82c /opt/bitnami/kubectl/bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
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# helm 3.21.3, not 3.16.2. 3.16.2 was built with Go 1.22.9 and carries CRITICAL
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# CVE-2025-68121 (crypto/tls) and CVE-2026-33186 (grpc), plus HIGH CVE-2026-35469
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# (spdystream, fixed in 0.5.1) — trivy fails the build on them and is right to.
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# Deliberately 3.x: helm 4 is a breaking change and is not a CVE fix.
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COPY --from=alpine/helm:3.21.3@sha256:35da09ba0716fc7c3cd63b6b31ee380a9c7662e95f29ab0e4ae962420afd315b /usr/bin/helm /usr/local/bin/helm
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# kubectl 1.35.3 from the OFFICIAL registry.k8s.io image, replacing
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# bitnamilegacy/kubectl:1.31.2. Two reasons, either sufficient:
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# - CVEs: the bitnami image is Go 1.22.9 and ships containerd < 1.7.29 (HIGH
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# CVE-2024-25621) along with the same crypto/tls and grpc CRITICALs as helm above.
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# - Skew: the target cluster runs v1.35.3. 1.31.2 is four minors behind, well outside
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# kubectl's supported +/-1 window, so it was unsupported against this cluster.
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# bitnamilegacy publishes no 1.35 tag. registry.k8s.io/kubectl is the upstream-maintained
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# image, is a manifest list with linux/arm64 (this cluster is Ampere), and puts the binary
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# at /bin/kubectl rather than bitnami's /opt/bitnami path.
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COPY --from=registry.k8s.io/kubectl:v1.35.3@sha256:8dad99b604a2c0bafe17f53cadf78482d6f667a6da687f385508f5f4e4696d37 /bin/kubectl /usr/local/bin/kubectl
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ENV PATH="/app/.venv/bin:$PATH" \
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PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1 \
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