b2cdcecdc13977926cb9d9d0d205c61d39c20566
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
c53734d2bc |
docs: add USER_GUIDE.md, tighten comments, fix CLI needing a DSN
ci / lint (push) Successful in 33s
ci / types (push) Successful in 43s
ci / unit (push) Successful in 32s
ci / security (push) Successful in 57s
ci / dockerfile (push) Successful in 7s
ci / chart (push) Successful in 8s
ci / integration (push) Successful in 55s
ci / image (api) (push) Successful in 3m39s
ci / image (reconciler) (push) Successful in 2m53s
ci / image (worker) (push) Successful in 2m14s
ci / bump (push) Successful in 16s
The comment pass is prose-only: every distinct "why" is kept, the narration around it is not. Verified by AST-comparing each changed file against HEAD with docstrings stripped — only the two files below differ in executable code. Two real fixes fell out of the read-through: * The CLI documented itself as never touching the database, then called load_settings(), which requires SVCFORGE_PG_DSN. It refused to start without a Postgres URL it never opens. It now has its own two-field ClientSettings; the orphaned api_url/api_token are dropped from Settings, where nothing else read them. * repo/db.py had the DictRow alias comment and the ERROR_MAX_CHARS comment run together above the wrong symbol. USER_GUIDE.md is the caller-facing guide the README only gestured at: auth, catalog, every endpoint with curl, the lifecycle, the error table, rate limiting, the CLI, client generation, an end-to-end poll loop. It records two facts about the live deployment rather than documenting a flow nobody can run. SVCFORGE_JWKS_URL points at a realm with no IdP behind it, so the API logs "JWKS warm-up failed" at startup and every /v1 request is a 401. And `helm repo list` in the worker returns no repositories, so the three bitnamilegacy/ catalog entries cannot resolve at provision time; only the oci:// entries can. make lint clean, 76 unit + 111 integration tests pass. |
||
|
|
bb8b14ef03 |
api: make the OpenAPI spec usable as documentation
ci / lint (push) Failing after 56s
ci / types (push) Has been skipped
ci / unit (push) Has been skipped
ci / integration (push) Has been skipped
ci / security (push) Has been skipped
ci / dockerfile (push) Has been skipped
ci / chart (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (api) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (reconciler) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (worker) (push) Has been skipped
ci / bump (push) Has been skipped
FastAPI already served /docs, /redoc and /openapi.json, and the ingress already
passed them through — the mechanism was there, the content was not. The schema
alone cannot tell a caller the three things they most need to know, and the
route docstrings explain implementation reasoning to a maintainer rather than
usage to a consumer.
Added to the spec itself, so it travels with the API rather than living in a
README the caller does not have:
- An app description covering bearer auth, that every write is 202 + poll,
the instance lifecycle, and the uniform {"code", "message"} error body.
- Tag descriptions for `instances` and `ops`.
- Field descriptions and worked examples on CreateInstanceRequest,
InstanceResponse and ErrorBody, so /docs shows a valid payload instead of
leaving callers to infer one.
The bearer scheme was already exposed via HTTPBearer, which is what makes the
Authorize button in /docs work; there is now a test asserting it stays, along
with the description, the tags and the request example. Docs that are not
tested rot silently, and this is the artifact other teams integrate against.
README documents the three URLs and how to generate a client from the spec.
|
||
|
|
c76154aeaa |
review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
ci / lint (push) Successful in 34s
ci / unit (push) Successful in 1m41s
ci / types (push) Successful in 1m41s
ci / dockerfile (push) Successful in 18s
ci / security (push) Successful in 1m27s
ci / chart (push) Failing after 1m11s
ci / integration (push) Successful in 1m10s
ci / image (api) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (reconciler) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (worker) (push) Has been skipped
ci / bump (push) Has been skipped
CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files. |
||
|
|
50c2fe2a1e |
svcforge: reference implementation
ci / lint (push) Successful in 1m19s
ci / unit (push) Failing after 1m2s
ci / integration (push) Has been skipped
ci / types (push) Successful in 1m37s
ci / security (push) Failing after 38s
ci / dockerfile (push) Successful in 14s
ci / image (api) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (reconciler) (push) Has been skipped
ci / image (worker) (push) Has been skipped
ci / bump (push) Has been skipped
Complete working build of the system learn-python/ teaches. 164 tests, mypy --strict clean, domain coverage 99%. |