d64c3c9f39df1a11f2441d6a1967b7f7c4800aaf
4 Commits
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d64c3c9f39 |
fix: three correctness bugs found in review + a dropped-log
fail() blanket-marked the instance `failed` for every dead-lettered task kind.
Only provision is correct. The others each left the instance in a state the
UPDATE then corrupted:
- deprovision: `deleting` -> `failed` stranded the instance, because
due_for_deprovision only re-selects ready/deleting, leaking the release
reconcile.py promises to reclaim.
- upgrade: helm --atomic rolled back, so the instance was still `ready` and
serving the old version; `failed` mislabelled a healthy service and dropped
it off the upgrade work-list.
- verify: handle_verify already halted the rollout; the instance was `ready`.
Now gated on kind == provision, with a regression test per kind (control-tested
against the blanket UPDATE, which fails all three).
The API exception handler was registered on fastapi.HTTPException, a subclass
of starlette's. Starlette matches handlers by walking type(exc).__mro__, so
framework-raised 404/405 never hit it and returned {"detail": ...} instead of
ErrorBody. Registered on the starlette parent, and added a
RequestValidationError handler so body-validation 422s share the shape too.
Tests assert the ErrorBody shape for framework 404, 405, and a forbidden field.
helm._list_releases_via_api built the httpx client with verify=<ca path>, which
loads the CA eagerly and raises OSError on a half-mounted ServiceAccount — an
error the except clause did not catch, crashing the reconciler tick as a bare
bug. Now the CA is checked for readability alongside the token, and a missing
one means "not in-cluster" and falls back to helm. Also documents the no-limit
pagination invariant and pins it with a test.
redis.py logged through stdlib logging with extra={"team": team}, which the
structlog bridge drops on the floor — the trap notify.py documents. Switched to
a bound logger with team as a kwarg.
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c537073c21 |
deps: everything to latest stable
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Python 3.12 -> 3.14, postgres 16 -> 18, uv 0.5.11 -> 0.11.29, trivy 0.58.1 -> 0.72.0, gitleaks 8.21.2 -> 8.30.1, yq 4.44.6 -> 4.53.3, and every action re-pinned to the SHA of its latest tag (checkout v7, setup-uv v8, buildx v4, login v4, hadolint v3.3.0). helm stays 3.21.3: already current for 3.x, and helm 4 is a breaking change, not a CVE fix. trivy mattered most. A vulnerability scanner fourteen minor versions behind is the one stale pin that hides all the others. ruff target-version is deliberately py313 while the runtime is 3.14. It controls the syntax the formatter may emit, and at py314 it rewrites 'except (A, B):' into PEP 758's unparenthesized form — which reads exactly like Python 2's 'except E, name:' and is a hard SyntaxError below 3.14. No semantic gain, real readability cost, in a repo meant to be read. Verified on 3.14: ruff, ruff format, mypy --strict, 166 tests, helm lint, bandit, pip-audit. The digest guard still rejects placeholder digests. Risk carried knowingly: the bumped actions run on node24. If act_runner only provides node20, every job fails at action startup and this commit is the revert. |
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c76154aeaa |
review: fix 26 findings from a 4-agent audit
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CORRECTNESS - lost-lease race: complete()/fail() did not check ownership, so a worker whose lease expired could mark a task done while another worker was running it, or requeue a task someone else owned. Reproduced, fixed with a CAS on (state, locked_by), pinned by two regression tests. - worker died on report failure: _run_one's docstring claimed no exception escapes the TaskGroup; fail()/complete() were outside the guarded block, so a DB blip cancelled every sibling provision on the pod. - claim query used an INNER join, which could strand a just-claimed task and report 'queue empty'. LEFT join. - InstanceRepo.set_error bypassed the state machine and had no callers. Deleted. - handle_deprovision ignored its CAS result, so a wrong-state instance kept a dangling endpoint and got re-provisioned by the drift check 60s later. - handle_verify re-notified on every retry: five pages for one halt. DEPLOY-BREAKING - the migration Job could never succeed: no Dockerfile copied migrations/, and migrate.py resolved the path relative to the source tree, which only works for an editable install. Added COPY + SVCFORGE_MIGRATIONS_DIR. - ServiceMonitor selector did not match the Service: API metrics never scraped. - SvcforgeReconcilerStale fired permanently from every pod, because the gauge is module-level and every service exports it as 0. Scoped to the reconciler job. - SvcforgeTaskFailed latched forever on a monotonic counter. Now increase()[15m]. - the digest guard accepted the all-zeros placeholder. - worker terminationGracePeriodSeconds was 60s against a 600s helm timeout. DEAD CODE THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN - adapters/k8s.py was never called, so tenant namespaces were never created and the first provision for a new team would fail. Wired into handle_provision. - adapters/redis.py was never imported by any service. Rate limiting is now wired into the API, failing open. - Settings.check_production() had no callers. Given an explicit environment and called from every entrypoint. OBSERVABILITY - the API never called obs.setup(): no JSON logs, no trace correlation, log_json silently inert. - LogNotifier's structured fields were discarded by the stdlib->structlog bridge. - bind_task_context cleared the 'service' binding for the life of every task. - split tasks_failed into task_attempts_failed and tasks_dead_lettered. SECURITY - trivy correctly blocked the worker/reconciler images: helm 3.16.2 and kubectl 1.31.2 carry CRITICAL Go stdlib CVEs. Bumped to helm 3.21.3 and kubectl 1.35.3, which also closes a four-minor skew against the v1.35.3 cluster. TESTS THAT COULD NOT FAIL - the concurrency cap test passed on a fully serial worker. - the alert/metric cross-check asserted a hardcoded list instead of reading the chart, so it could not catch a rename on the chart side. - fixed OTel tracer-provider pollution between test files. DOCS - ARCHITECTURE.md: mermaid diagrams, user stories, and the helm-vs-ArgoCD guarantee (verified with --dry-run=server). - AGENTS.md + CLAUDE.md. - prose sweep for back-and-forth phrasing across 19 files. |
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50c2fe2a1e |
svcforge: reference implementation
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Complete working build of the system learn-python/ teaches. 164 tests, mypy --strict clean, domain coverage 99%. |